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390 PEOPLE v. RICCIARDI [23 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 17826. In Bank. Dec. 21, 1943.J 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. ANTONINO RICCIARDI 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Eminent D?main-Compensation-Damnum Absque Injuria. 
-:-l~ a,,:ardmg damages in eminent domain, not every depre-
CIatIOn lD the value of property not taken can be made the 
basis of an a ward of damages. 
[2] :a:ighwaYS:-Ri~hts ~f Abutter.-An abutting owner has two 
kmds of rI~h.ts lD a hIghway, a public right which he enjoys with 
a~l other clt~zens,and certain private rights which arise from 
hIS. ownershIp of, property contiguous to the highway, and 
,,:hICh are not common to the public generally. His special 
fIght ?f easement an.d user in the highway for access pur-
poses IS a p~oper~y rIght which cannot be damaged or taken 
away from hIm WIthout due compensation. 
(3] EminentDomain~Compensation_What Constitutes Taking 
o~ Da~aging .. - "Actionable interference" with a property 
r~ght IS no different from "substantial impairment" of the 
rIght. 
[4] High~ays-A1teration-Damages-Diversion of Traffic.-An 
abuttmg owner has no property right in any particular flow 
of traffic over the highway, and the re-routing or diver~ion of 
normal traffic is not compensable; but he does have the right 
o~ direct access to the highway and an easement of reasonable 
Vlew of .the pro~erty from such highway, and are-routing 
of t~e hIghway l~ relation to the property, not a mere re-
routm~ of traffic m relation to the highway, is a taking and 
damagmg of the owner's private rights and is compensable. 
[6] Eminent Domain-Remedies for Unlawful Taking.-When 
com~ensation is claimed either for a taking or a damaging, 
the Issues may be presented for adjudication either in a pro-
ceeding in eminent domain or by a property owner's action 
for compenElation for the taking or damaging of his property 
or both, as the case may be. 
[2] Damages for widening street as including injury to access 
note, 64 A:L.R. 1527. See, also, 10 Cal.Jur. 333; 18 Am.Jur. 789. ' 
McK. DIg. Referen~es: [lJ Em~nent Domain, § 47; [2,19J High-
ways, § 107; [3] EmlI~ent DomaI~, § 45; [4, 10, 12-17, 19] High-
ways, § 62; [5, 6J Emment Domam, § 194; [7] Eminent Domain 
§ 66; [8) Eminent Domain, § 71; [9] Eminent Domain § 92' [U' 
18] Eminent Domain, § 161. ' , , 
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[6] Id. - Remedies for Unlawful Taking -,Pro~edural Differ-
ences.-':ln an action for damages for the taking or . damag-
ing of private property without compensation ihe:property 
owner assumes the burden of alleging'arid" ptovirig'li1s;prop-
erty right and the infringement thereof,' tind the' qttestion ' 
whether his allegations in that behalf are: sufficient, may···· be . 
determined on demurrer. In a proceeding ineininent domain: 
the condemning authority, in commencing it,affirmatively 
alleges ownership in the property. owner", the ,contemplated 
taking and severance, and seeks a determination. by,,~the :.court 
. of issues confided by law to its decision, as'well,ua;.deter-
mination by the jury, unless one be waiyed"as to,the':com-
pensation which should be paid to' him ... , ."'" 
[7] Id.-Compensation-Value of PropertyTaken~.-:-The law 
has adopted market value as establishing actnal,value of 
property taken for public use. 
[8] Id. - Compensation - Damages to OontiguousLand -:-How . 
Determined.-If property sought to be condemned consti-
tutes only a part of a larger, parcel, the damages are' to be 
determined by ascertaining the market v.alueofthe portion 
not sought to be taken, and by deducting therefrom the mar-
ket value thereof after the severance and construction of the 
improvement. 
[9] Id.-Compensation-Evidence-Damages toContlgUou8 Land. 
-Damages to contiguous land may be shown 'by prov-
ing the market value of the remainder before and after the 
taking and leaving the computation of the difference to the 
jury, or by competent evidence of severance damages in a 
lump sum. 
[10] Highways..,..A1teration-Damages.-Damages may not be 
allowed for diminution of property value resulting from high-
way changes causing diversion of traffic; circuity of travel 
beyond an intersecting street, or other noncompensable items. 
[11] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Trial-Province of OOltrt 
and Jury.-When an eminent domain proceeding comes on 
for hearing, all issues except the sole issue relating to com-
pensation, are to be tried by the court, and if the court does 
not make special findings on those issues its findings thereon 
al'e implicit in the verdict awarding compensation. 
[12] Highways---'Alteration-Damages-Provfnce of Oourt' and 
Jury.-In an action in eminent· domain to condemn land for 
the widening of a state highway, it was within the province 
of the trial court and not the jury to pass upon the question 
whether under the facts presented, the defendant abutting 
owners' right of access would be substantially impaired. 
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[13J Id.-Alteration-Damages-Province of Court and Jury.-
In an action in eminent domain to condemn land for the 
widening of a stato highway, the question whether the abut-
ting o.wners possessed a right which was damaged was for 
the trIal court to determine. 
[14J Id.-Alteration-Damages-Province of Court and Jury.-
In an action in eminent domain to condemn land for the 
widening of a state highway, it was for the trial court to 
determine whether an obstruction caused by a proposed un-
derpass wou~d. u?:easonably cut off the abutting owners' prop-
erty from VISIbIlIty by travelers on the main highway and 
the right being substantially impaired, the amount or' dam~ 
ages was a question for the jury. 
[15] Id.-Alteration-Damages-Evidence_Sufficiency._In an 
action t? condemn land ~or the widening of a state highway, 
the ~ndmgs and conclu~IOns of the trial court implicit in the 
verdIct as to the abuttmg owners' loss of their easement of 
visibility were supported by the evidence and will not be dis-
turbed on appeal. 
[16] ~d.-Alteration-Damages-Severance Damages.-In an ac-
tion to condemn land for the widening of a state highway no 
just criticism could be made of the award of severance d~m­
ages in the sum of $15,000, where the entire property was 
valued at as much as $68,000 and the severance damage was 
estimated at as high as $41,759. 
[17J Id.-Alteration-Damages-Appeal_Harmless and Rever-
sible Error.~In an ~ction to condemn land for the widening 
of a state hIghway, It was error but not prejudicial error for 
the court to instruct the ,jury that the question whether the 
defendants had suffered an infringement of their rights in the 
property not sought to be condemned was a question of fact 
for the jury to determine, where the record showed that the 
defendants ,,:ould suffer. an infringement of their rights by 
the construction of the Improvement in the manner proposed 
and the trial court had in effect already so held. 
[18] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Tri<tl-Province of Court 
and Jury.-In an eminent domain proceeding, the question 
wheth?r th~re has been a substantial impairment of a prop-
erty nght IS one of law,. or of fact, or a mixed question of 
~a~ and fac~, for the trIal court to determine. In no case 
IS It a questIOn of fact for the jury. 
[19] Highways-Alteration-Damages-Instructions._In an ac-
J [14] Easement of view, note, 90 A.L.R. 793. See, also, 25 Am. Dr. 451. 
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tion to condemn land for the widening of a state highway, 
the trial court did not err in refusing an instruction requested 
by plaintiff advising- the jury that any element or deprecia-
tion in the market value of the property not sought to be 
condemned by reason of the construction. of the highway in 
the manner proposed would be of a general nat1,11'e and not 
special and peculiar to the defendants' property. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Caryl M. Sheldon, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action in eminent domain to condemn land for widening. 
of a state highway. Judgment for defendants affirmed. 
Lincoln V. Johnson, Clifford D. Good, Holloway Jones, 
George C. Hadley, C. R. Montgomery, Frank B. Durkee and 
Robert E. Reed for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Everett W. Mattoon, 
Deputy Attorney General, Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, 
William H. Neal and Frederiek von Schrader, Assistants City 
Attorney, Charles F. Reiehe, Deputy City Attorney, J. Allen 
Davis and George E. Sandford as Amici Curiae on Behalf of 
Appellant. 
Holbrook & Tarr and Leslie R. Tarr for Respondents. 
SHENK, J.-In this aetion in eminent domain the plain-
tiff appeals from a judgment on a verdict :fixing the com-
pensation to be paid to the defendants for the land taken 
and for damages to the remainder by. reason of the severance 
and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed. 
The purpose of the condemnation proceeding is to acquire 
land sufficient to effeetuate, by means of an underpass, the 
separation of the grade of Rosemead Boulevard at its inter-
section with Ramona Boulevard in Los Angeles County. The 
double tracks of the Pacific Electric' RailwayCoznpany tra~ 
verse Ramona Boulevard on the route'fl'om Los Angeles to 
San Bernardino and cross Rosemead Boulevard at the inter-
section. " !" 
The defendants are the owners of property located at the 
northeast corner of Rosemead and Ramona Boulevl!!'ds, 
[23C.2d 
both of which are state highways. The property of the de-
fendants is improved with a modern slaughter house and 
retail meat market, both set back from the highways so as 
to afford parking facilities. A residence with a large storage 
basement faces Rosemead Boulevard. Ingress and egress is 
afforded the entire property Ii !ong both boulevards, with 
driveways leading into the property from the two highways. 
At present Rosemead Boulevard fronting on defendants' 
property is 60 feet wide. By the proposed improvement It 
is intended to make this boulevard 280 feet wide. It will 
consist of four lanes, two in the underpass, and two outer 
lanes on each side thereof, designated as service roads, the 
latter being 30 feet wide. Rosemead Boulevard will com-
mence to pass under Ramona Boulevard at a point southerly 
thereof and will come to grade northerly thereof at Glendon 
Way, the latter of which is the first cross or intersecting 
street north of defendants' pI'operty, approximately 525 feet 
north of Ramona Boulevard. The underpass will reach a 
maximum depth of seventeen feet. Visibility of traffic in 
that portion of the underpass directly in front of the de-
fendants' remaining property on Rosemead Boulevard will 
be entirely cut off. Between the underpass and the remain-
ing property a lane designated as a service road thirty feet 
in width is provided' for at grade. A ten-foot sidewalk strip 
between the service road and the defendants' property is also 
provided fo.r. A dividing strip 50 feet wide at Glendon Way 
narrowing to 25 feet at the covered portion of the underpass 
is between the service road and the easterly wall of the under-
pass. This strip is left for support and landscaping purposes. 
The highway plans show that the portion of Ramona 
Boulevard to the north of the railway right of way is to 
have a 35 foot freeway for westbound fast traffic and an 
outer lane 30 feet wide, also called a service road, for local 
traffic. To the south of the railway right of way a similar 
freeway for eastbound fast traffic is provided for. The ser-
vice road on Rosemead Boulevard and the service road on 
Ramona Boulevard will connect at the southeast corner of 
the defendants' property and at that point there is access 
to the westbound traffic on Ramona Boulevard. The service 
road on Rosemead extends to Glendon Way, which is the next 
intersecting street to the north. There is a conflict in the 
evidence as to whether the service road paralleling- Ramona 
Boulevard extends to the next intersecting street to the east. 
Dec. 1943] PEOPLE V. RICC!lARDl 
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The service roads are at the grade of defendants' property. 
When the underpass is constructed upon the westerly portion 
of the property taken from the defendants the grade of Rose-
mead Boulevard will be changed 80 as to effectively block, • 
all ingress and egress to and from the main highway except 
by traversing the service road to Glendon Way .. and then. 
making a left turn into the boulevard~ . . ',";1 '.' •.... ' .1\ 
A verdict was rendered awarding the .d~f~ndml~ $9,QOQ,\ 
for the taking of parcel 1, and damagesto~e~ ;r~~ainR-.~r J>y,t 
reason of the severance and the .constructi0:t::t,o,~. the .• imp,~o;V~U} 
mentin the manner proposed mthesum ,of ,$l,5,OOO!;c: F()~~t 
the taking of parcel 2, the sum of $350.was8ll.o!¥d,)With n~;I 
severance damages. . , .; . .., / ,"': ,. :;) . . '.;.! 
The main attack on the judgment is the award.Jor sever- ) 
ance damages. During the course of the trial, witIlesseswere 
produced to prove market values.. . On ,the exairiin,ation of i" 
the defendants' witnesses the plaintiiI took .the position and. 
now asserts that considerations of interference. with . the de~.l 
fendants' right of access to th,e main highway:resulting from,t 
the construction of the improvement and. the consequent en-. 
forced circuity of travel to and from' the property to the 
main highway as proposed may not proI>erly be. taken into 
account in fixing severance damages; also,that the defend-
a~ts' claimed loss of visibility to and from the main highway. 
as proposed could not be taken into considerll-tiOl:l 'as aiIe.cting 
market value. At the instance of the plaintiiI,thetrial"cQurt 
at first excluded all evidence relating to' those' . subjects, but. 
finally was persuaded by the defendants 'count~r position 
that under the facts presented such interference m,.th access., . 
and loss of visibility should be taken into consideration iiI' 
determining market value. Accordingly, the court admitted 
evidence bearing on those issues and submitted the question. 
of the extent of the severance damages caused thereby to' the' 
jury. One of the principal contentions of the plaintiiI on 
the appeal is the asserted error of the trial court in admitting 
that evidence. 
[1] Not every depreciation in the value of the property 
not taken can be made the basis of an award of damages. In 
the absence of a declaration by other competent authority the 
courts have been called upon to define rights claimed to be 
infringed in violation of section 14, article I, .of the Consti-
tution; also to place limitations on the extent 'of those rights' 
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and to declare when and under what circumstances· recovery 
may be had by the property owner for a violation thereof. 
The ~ourts have assumed the burden and responsibility of 
defimng those rights and of limiting their extent because of 
the necessity of safeguarding the constitutional rights of 
private parties on the one hand and on the other hand of 
seeing to it that the cost of public improvements involving 
the taking and damaging of private property for public use 
be not unduly enhanced. The law on the subject of the na-
ture and .ext~mt of the rights o~ the property owner abutting 
on a public hIghway and of the mfringement of those rights is 
therefore, in substantial part, case law. For example, it has 
been held in this state that injury to the business of the 
owner or occupant of the property does not form an element 
o~ the compensating damages to be awarded (Oakland v. Pa-
cific Coast Lumber etc. Co., 171 Cal. 392 [153 P. 705]). 
This is so because it is only the value of, and the damage to 
the. proper:y itself, which may be considered. A particula: 
busmess mIght be entirely destroyed and yet not diminish 
the actual value of the property for its highest and best use. 
(See 10 Cal.Jur. 341, sec. 55.) It has also been held in this 
state that an abutting owner has no right to compensation 
by reason of diversion of traffic away from his property (Rose 
v. St.ate ~f California, 19 Cal.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505] ; People 
v. G~ann~, 130 Cal.App. 584 [20 P.2d 87] ; City of Stockton 
v. M~rengo, 137 Cal.App. 760 [31 P.2d 467]). 
Nelth~r in the Co~sti.tution nor in statutes do we find any 
declaratIOn of the mCldents of ownership or elements of 
v~lue which specifically creates or defines or limits the two 
r~g~ts which are ~volved he:e. But we do find general pro-
VISIOns of la:w. WhICh are baSIC to our consideration. Section 
658 of th~ CIvil Code declares that "Real or immovable prop-
erty conslSts of: 1. Land; 2. That which is affixed to land' 
3. That :which is incidental or appurtenant to land . . . ": 
and sectIOn 662 of the same code defines appurtenances in 
general language as follows: "A thing is deemed to be inci-
dental or appurtenant to land when it is by right used with 
the land for its benefit, as in the case of a way, or water-
course, or of a passage for light, air, or heat from or across 
the land of an.ot,her." Section 1248 and related sections of 
~he Code of CIVIl Procedure, which prescribe the procedure 
In condemnation actions, do not assume to create rights of 
Dec. 1943] PEOPLE V. RICCIARDI 
[23 0.24 390] 
397 
ownership, or to define the incidents thereof or the elements 
of value. It is, therefore, necessary for this co.urt to deter-
mine whether the claimed items are, or shall be, included 
among the incidents or appurtenances of real property within 
the purview of the generai definition of appurtenances above 
quoted, and are therefore to be considered as elements of 
value attaching to private property and for which compen-
sation must be paid when the same is· taken or damaged for a 
public use in eminent domain proceedings. 
The courts of this state, from time immemorial and in 
cases too numerous to mention, have declared and enforced 
the abutting property owner's right to a free and convenient 
use of and access to the highway on which his property abuts. 
(Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. 00., 103 Cal. 614, 617 [37 
P. 570, 42 Am.St.Rep. 149]; Geurkink v. Oity of Petalwma, 
112 Cal. 306, 308 [44 P. 570] ; O'Oonnor v. Southern Pacific 
R. R. Co., 122 Cal. 681 [55 P. 688] ; Brown v. Board of Super-
visors, 124 Cal. 274, 280 [57 P. 82]; Eachus v: City of Los 
Angeles, 130 Cal. 492 [62 P. 829, 80 Am.St.Rep. 147] ; Smith 
v. Southern PacifiC R. R. 00., 146 Cal. 164 [79 P. 868, 106 
Am.St.Rep. 17]; Williams v. Los Angeles Railway 00., 150 
Cal. 592 [89 P. 330] ; Wilcox v. Engebretsen, 160 Cal. 288, 
299 [116 P. 750] ; Lane v. San Diego Elec. Ry. 00., 208 Cal. 
29, 33 [280 P. 109] ; McCandless v. Oity of Los Angeles, 214 
Cal. 67, 71 [4 P.2d 139] ; Rose v. State, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 
727 [123 P.2d 505] ; Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), p. 177; 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed.), vol. 4, pp. 79, 
85; Nichols, Eminent Domain (2d ed..) , p. 503.) It was de-
clared in the case of Eachus v. Los .Angeles etc. Ry. 00., 
supra, 103 Cal. 614 [37 P. 570, 42 Am.St.Rep. 149], at p. 617, 
that this right of ingress and egress attaches to the lot and 
is a right of property as fully as is the lot itself and any 
act by which that easement is destroyed or substantially im-
paired for the benefit of the public, is a damage to the lot 
itself, within the meaning of the constitutional provision 
under which the owner is entitled to compensation. 
[2] It is also the settled law that "An abutting owner 
has two kinds of rights in a highway, a public right which 
he enjoys in common with all other citizens, and certain pri-
vate rights which arise from his ownership of property con-
tiguous to the highway, and which are not common to the pub~ 
lic generally; • •• An abutting landowner on a public high-
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way has a special right of easement and user in the public 
road for access purposes, and this is a property right which 
cannot be damaged or taken away from him without due com-
pensation. [Citing cases.]" (Lane v. San Diego Elec. Ry. 
Co., 208 Cal. 29, 33 [280 P. 109].) 
But as we view. the record in this case we are not called 
upon to declare new rights of property in the abutting owner 
but to define the extent of existing rights, to determine 
whether the trial court committed error in its rulings on the 
admission of evidence on the subjects of impairment of access 
and loss of visibility as affecting the market value of the 
defendants' existing property rights and whether the find-
ings and conclusions of the trial court on those subjects are 
supported by sufficient evidence. 
The plaintiff does not take the position that the evidence 
is insufficient to support some award of severance damages 
based on other elements bearing on market value. There is 
evidence of substantia.l severance damages on account of a 
reduction in size of the remaining land, of the severance of 
the remaining land into an irregular strip, of the curtailment 
of the remaining parking area, of the reduction of the com-
mercially ~oned portion Qf the property whic;h corners upon 
the two hIghways, and of the impairment of the ,use of the 
property as a functioning unit caused by the taking of in-
tegral parts of the operating plant. No complaint is made 
of the consideration of those matters in fixing severance dam-
ages. But it is insisted by the plaintiff that no actionable 
interference with the right of access results from so-called 
:ircuity of travel to which an abutting owner may be sub-
Jected as the result ~f the construction of a public improve-
ment; that such an mterference is but an inconvenience suf-
fered only in :ommon with the general public; that it· has 
no proper relatIOn to the abutting property owner's easement 
of I~gress and egress and that it cannot therefore be. a right 
specIal .an~ peculiar to his right of property. Counsel for 
the. plam~ ~pparently concede that if the interference is 
actIonable It IS a proper matter to be considered in fixing 
co~pens~tion, for it is said in that behalf that "under the 
CalIforma 'or damages' clause compensation is not· allowed 
except for .an actionable interference with a property ~ight." 
[3] "~ctIonable interference" with a property right can 
be no dIfferent/rom "s~?stantial impairment" of the right 
as that phrase 18 so famIlIarly used in the cases. 
Dec. 1943] PEOPLE v. RICCIARDI 
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[4] The contention that the disPuted elements of dam-
age-the taking or impairment of the right of direct access 
to the through highways and the taking or impairment of the 
right of visibility to and from the one highway (Rosemead 
Boulevard) in relation to the remaining property-are non-
compensable as bein~ the result of police power regulation, 
cannot be sustained under the facts and law applicable here. 
We recognize that the defendants have no property right.in 
any particular flow of traffic over the highway adjacent to 
their property, but they do possess the right of direct access 
to the through traffic highway and an easement of 0 reasonable 
view of their property from such highway. If traffic nor-
mally flowing over that highway were re~routed or if an-
other highway were constructed which resulted' in' a substan-
tialamount of traffic being diverted from that through high-
way the value of their property might thereby be~niinished, 
but in such event defendants would have no right· to comperi~ . 
sation by reason of such re-routing or, :diyersion: of traffic. 
The re-routing or diversion of traffic in> such a: coase would 
be a mere police power regulation, or the"~:naidental result 
of a lawful act, and not the taking or' damagmgof a prop-, 
erty right. But here we do not have a. mere re-routing 
or diversion of traffic from the highway; ~e have, instead, 
a substantial change in the highway it~e1fin ',relation to 
the defendants' property; i. e.; a re~routhig of·thehigh~ 
way in relation to defendants' property rather than a"mere 
re-routing of traffic in relation to the highway. pefendants' 
private property rights in and to that highway are to he taken 
and damaged. It is only for such private" property 0 :rights 
that compensation has been assessed; 'Th,ecour,t 'iillowedno 
damages to be predicated on any diversion of traffic from the 
highway but it did properly allow damages to. be;based on 
diversion of the highway from direct access to 0 defendants' 
property. .. .. 
Prior to the enactment in 1879 of section 14 of article 1 
of the Constitution the problem of compensating for damages 
to the remainder where the whole .parcel was not taken did 
not arise. Compensation for the land taken for public use was 
the only matter for consideration. In Reardon v. San Fran-
cisco, 66 Cal. 492 [6 P. 317, 56 Am.Rep. 109], it was held 
for the first time that the addition of the words "or dam-
aged" embraced more than the " taking" provided for in 
.. 
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the Constitution of 1849, and gave to the property owner a 
remedy which he did not previously have. The addition of 
the "or damaged" phrase in the present constitutional pro-
vision has given rise to many difficult problems with refer-
ence to the extent of the rights of the owner of property 
damaged where none is taken and where part of a larger 
parcel is taken and the remainder is claimed to be damaged 
by reason of the severance and the construction of the im-
provement in the manner proposed. Where the whole is taken 
no question of severance damages is, of course, involved. 
[0] When compensation is claimed either for a taking or a dam-
aging the issues may be presented for adjUdication in at least 
two forms of action. In one there is an absence of a proceed-
ing in eminent domain. In that form of action the property 
owner seeks relief by bringing an action for compensation 
for a taking or a damaging of his property or both, as the 
case may be. Illustrative of that class of cases with many 
others in our reports are McCandless v. City of Los Angeles, 
214 Cal. 67 [4 P.2d 139], the more recent case of Rose v. 
State of California, 19 Ca1.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505], and the 
current case of Bacick v. Board of Control, ante, p. 343 
[144 P.2d 818]. 
The other form of action is, as here, a proceeding in eminent 
domain in which the procedure is laid down by section 1248 
and related sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. [6] In 
both actions the result is the same in that in each the property 
owner receives compensation for the invasion of his private 
right; but the procedure in arriving at the result is different. 
In the one case the property owner assumes the burden· of 
alleging and proving his property right and the infringe-
ment thereof, and the question whether his allegations in that 
behalf are sufficient may be determined on demurrer. In the 
other case the condemning authority, in commencing the pro-
ceeding, affirmatively alleges ownership in the defendants, 
the contemplated taking and severance, and seeks a determi-
nation by the court of issues confided by the law to the 
~ecision of the court and also seeks a determination by the 
Jury, unless one be waived, of the compensation which should 
be paid to the property owner. 
It is provided in section 1248 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure that the jury "must hear such legal testimony as may 
be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and there-
Dec. 1943] PEOPLE V. RICCIARDI 
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upon must ascertain and assess: 1. The value of the prope~y 
sought to be condemned, and all improvements thereon pe:tam-
ing to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or mter-
est therein; ... 2. If the properly sought to be condemned c?n-
stitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the daIDages WhICh 
will accrue. to the portion not sought to be condemned, ~y 
reason of its severance from the portio? sought to ~.e co~~ 
demned and the construction of the lIDprovetttent m . th~ 
manner' proposed by the plaintiff." Sectio~ 124~ prOVIdes 
that for the purpose of assessing compensatIon and .damages 
the "actual value" thereof at the date specified ': ~hall be 
the measure of compensation for all property to be actually 
taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually 
taken but injuriously affected." 
[7] The law has adopted market value as establishing ac-
tual value. (Sacramento etc. R. R. Co. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 
408 [104 P.979].) The court said in that case at pa~e 409 
that as to the land actually taken "the rule is of ulllversal 
acceptance that the measure of this damage is the market 
value; that is to say, the highest price estimated in ter~s of 
money which the land would bring if exposed for sale m the 
open market, with reasonable time allowed in which to find 
a purchaser, buying with knowledge of all.o:ft~e uses andpu~: 
poses to which it was adapted and for whlch It was capable. 
[8] As to the damages to the remainder by reason. of t~e 
severance an instruction in that case waS approved WhICh lald 
down th; rule that such damages should be determined by 
ascertaining the market value of the portion not sought to be 
taken (as of the date fixed by statute, which in this case was 
November 23 1938) and by deducting therefrom the market 
value thereof' after the severance and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed. by the pla~n:iff. This 
measure of damages is in accordance wlth the provlsIons of the 
code sections referred to. [9] Such damages may be shown 
by proving the market value of the rema~nder before . and 
after the taking and leaving the computatIon of the differ-
ence to the jury or by competent evidence of severance dam-
ages in a lump s~m as was done by the testimony of witnesses 
in this case. [10] Of course, as above indicated, in apply-
ing this rule damages may not be allowed for diminu:ion ~f 
property value resulting from. highway changes .causmg .di-
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street, or other noncompensable ite 
Oalifornia, supra; Bacich v B dms. (See Rose v. State of 
[11] When the proceed" oar of Oontrol, supra.) 
except the sole issuQ relath:n~ comes on for hearing all issues 
by the Court and if th g °dcompensation, are to be tried 
.' e court oes not mak . . on those ISsues its findings th . e speCIal findIngs 
. ereon are Impli 't' th . awardIng compensation (V II . CI In e verdIct 
c~ard 00., 169 Cal. 545, 556a [~;7 e~. R. R. 00. v. Reed Or-
cific Ooast Lumber etc 0 . 238J; Oakland v. Pa-
at page 397.) In the Va;". supra, 171 Cal. 392 [153 P. 705J 
"A condenmation suit is :J~ Ca~\the court. said at page 556 : 
cluded in the classes mention pec~a pr~ceedIng. It is not in-
Procedure J in which a ju ~d In s~ctIon 592 [Code of Civil 
pressly made applicable try 18 ~eqUlre? T~at section is ex-
Proc. § 1256.) It follows ~hC:tn emnatlOn SUIts. (Code Civ. 
pensation, the issues of fa t .' except those relating to com-
be tried by the court and t~a;~ f ~hcondemnation suit, are to 
jury it is neverthel~ss r . 1 e court submits them to a 
adopting the verdI'ct th eqUlred to make findings either by 
ereon Or by m ki fi . 
Own language." In th 0 kl a ng ndmgs in its 
th e a and case th . at the question whether th e POInt was urged 
t · e parcels of 1 d' s Ituted one parcel within th . an Involved con-
the Code of Civil Pro demeanIng of section 1248 of 
f ce ure must be b't or determination Th . su mI ted to the jury 
th . e Court saId at pag 397 "B . e state nor any of its ma d t' e: ut neIther 
corporation, exercising the ; a orle;, no: any other pl'rson or 
pelled to SUbmit to the deter o~er.o emIn~nt domain, iH COlli-
of fact (Vallejo etc R R Om natIOn of a Jury every question 
545 [147 P. 238]) ~nd' th: o. v'. Reed Orchard 00., 169 Cal 
, 18 questIon of fact (1 . or not, the probative facts b . . name y, whether 
resultant fact establishes th e.Ing WIthout controversy, the 
a portion is to be taken) . e eXlste.nce of a parcel from which 
th d '. IS essentIally a qu t' e etermInatlOn of th es Ion of law for e court. It is 1 th ' the 'award,' which ou '. on y e compensation' 
and fixed by a jury. 'll1c~:!~tutlOn .declares shall be found 
fact and law, are to be t . d q~estlOns of fact, or of mixed 
th . rle , as In many othe . . d' . ey are trIed without ref . r JurIS IctlOns 
§ 14) '" erence to a JUry (C '. The law declared in the . onst., art. I, 
lowed In this state without d . t' se two cases has been fol. 
[12] eVla IOn 
It was therefore within th . . 
and not the jury to pass e provInce of the trial court 
facts presented, the def u~on t~e ~uestjon whether under the 
en ants rIght of access will be !lub-
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stantially impaired. If it will be so impaired the extent of 
the impairment is for the jury to determine. This. is but 
another way of saying that the trial court and not the Jury 
must decide whether in the particular case there win be an 
actionable interference with the defendants' right of accp.ss. 
'This the trial court did when it ruled on the admission of 
evidence and in iU! instructions to the jury. 
[13] In admitting the evidence objected to by the plaintiff 
the trial court was necessarily guided' by the settled law with 
reference to an abutter's rights and by the facts presented 
in the case. The record is voluminous and consists of a large 
relief map, numerous other maps and many volumes of tran· 
scribed testimony. This evidence was before the court at 
the close of the defendants' case at which time the ruling 
was made permitting the expert witnesses to t.estify to the 
effect upon the market value of the property not tvken by 
reason o,f the contemplated improvement and the consequent 
requirement that the owner must thereafter take another 1'0ute 
to reach the through traffic lane which before the improve. 
ment was immediately in front of his premises.' To sustain 
the plaintiff's position would require a ruling by this court 
to the effect that although a landowner's easement of access 
has been substantially impaired, under no circumstances 
should circuity of travel occasioned thereby enter into a com· 
putation of the damages to be awarded. Such a ruling obvi-
ously would be beyond the bounds of propriety~' Certainly 
the plaintiff would not contend that ifthe,nnderPass becoh~' 
structed as proposed and no means of' access' to Rosemead 
Boulevard be provided for, the defendants would be without 
redress. It is too plain to admit of' argument that if ·the 
underpass be constructed as proposed' and" 'the semce' road~ 
were not provided for in the contemplated improvement,· the 
defendants' right of access to Rosemead Boulevard would b~ 
practically destroyed. In providing for the service' roads the 
state must be deemed to have proceeded in frank recognition 
of the private right of access possessed by the defendantS, 
that such right would be invaded, and intended by meims of 
those service roads to minimize and entirely absorb the diitbL 
ages to which the defendants would otherwise, be entitled. 
But in any event the question whether the defendants pos-
sessed a right which was damaged was for the trial court 
to determine. As to how much the service roads would Initi· 
",,' 
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gate the damage, i. e., how much would be the net damage, 
was a question of fact for the jury. (See Knox Oounty v. 
Le Marr, 20 Tenn.App. 258 [97 S.W.2d 659, 661].) 
[14] It is also the position of the state that evidence of 
loss of visibility has not been justified in this case as a part 
of access and that it can be justified on no other, theory. 
The weight of authority seems to be in favor of the proposi-
tion that an abutting owner of property on a public highway 
has an easement of reasonable view of his property from the 
highway (90 A.L.R. 793, 794, and cases cited i 29 C.J.B., 
p. 912, sec. 905). The right of reasonable view in addition 
to the right of ingress and egress is named as one of the 
easements possessed by the abutting owner in Williams v. Los 
Angeles By. 00., 150 Cal. 592, 595 [89 P. 332J. Here 
again it was for the trial court to determine whether the 
obstruction caused by, the underpass would unreasonably cut 
off defendants' property from visibility by travelers on the 
main highway, and, the right being substantially impaired, the 
amount of damage was a question for the jury. [15] The 
findings and conclusion of the trial court implicit in the ver-
dict are supported by the evidence and may not now properly 
be disturbed. 
[16] No just criticism can be made of the severance dam-
ages awarded in the light of the record in this case. The 
entire property was valued at as much as $68,000 and the 
severance damage was estimated as high as $41,779. In view 
of this evidence an award of $15,000 on the latter item can-
not be set aside on appeal. 
[17] The plaintiff complains of certain instructions given 
and of the refusal to give others. Instruction No. 22 as given 
is assigned as error because by it the court advised the jury 
that the question whether the defendants had suffered an 
infringement of their rights in the property not sought to be 
condemned was a "question of fact for the jury" to determine. 
The giving of that instruction was error, but no preju-
dice resulted from it, because the record shows beyond ques-
tion that the defendants would suffer an infringement of 
their rights by the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed. Furthermore, the trial court had in effect 
already held that such impairment would be suffered and 
, as above stated, its finding and conclusion in that respect 
are implied in the verdict. 
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. . th 0 inion in McCandless ,v; Oityo! : 
CertaIn language In e I p 67 [4 P .2d 139] i at page 7l~ is H 
Los Angeles, supra, 214 Ca. . t'fying that instruction.'" 
ref~rred to b~ ~h~, defen:~n!~ea~;f~:gement of herrlght is .. 
It IS there said. . Whet e l' fii's property and has re", 
special and peculIa: t~ the. p ma::t lof her right, is a question, 
sulted in a substantial ImpaIr I in that case was, to 
" The purpose of the appea , " 
of ,fact . . . I . t to state a cause of actIon 
test the sufficiency of the co~p ~In ment of a propertY right 
fordamag~ ~or an alle~~d t~~f~~l~e question involve~ on t~e 
of the plaIn~lff. Th~t w it the following was saidlmmedl. 
appeal and In paSSIng on ted' "and we think 
ately after. the . langua~e la~t a~~:ein~u°riot . only the speci~l 
the compl~Int IS suffi~e~: l~nfrin:ement as applied to .sald 
and peculIar nature 0 b:tantial impairment of that rlg?t 
property, but also t~e s~ d a matter of law that the plaIn7 
At least it may not ~ sal as" uffered no damage." , 
tiff under her allegatIOns h~s s , . d 'd together it is 
[18] When both quotatIOns are cdonsl le~e with the suffi-
th d' cussion had to 0 so e y 
obvious that e IS. state a cause of action. The quoted 
ciency of the. cOmplaIn~ to th defendants as justification for 
language relIed. upon'y ,e not as full as it might have 
the challenged InstructIOn was t f the law so far as it goes. 
been, but it is a correct sta!e~e~heo law on the subject would 
A more complete stateme~ 0 hether there has been a sub-
have been that the questIon w t right is a question of 
stantial imp airmen, t of ,her propt.er y Ji law and fact for the 
. d ques Ion Ool , 
law or of fact, or a mlxe . .t a "question of fact 
tri;l court to determine. !n no case IS 1 , 
for the jury" to determIne. the refusal to give the 
[19] No error a~pears ~ecause ~~ It would have advised 
plai~tiff's proposed Instr~ct~o~e~;~ciaiion in market value of. 
the Jury that any elemen 0 be condemned by reason of the 
the property not sou?ht to t in the manner proposed 
construction of the Impr~vemen d not special. and peculiar 
would be of a ge~eral na ure an sub' ect matter of this in-
to the defendants property. ~:e tio! of the jury and was 
struction was not for the conSI era 
properly refuse~.. 'f' d by the plaintiff hut Other instructIOns gIven are cn IClZe 
find 0 in any of them. h 
we no err r . f the police power by t e 
No question of the exerCIse 0 • imply a condemna-
state is involved in this case. The case 18 s 
'. 
406 
PEOPLE v. RICCIARDI [23 C.2d 
ti~n suit in which the only questions properly to be deter-
mI~ed. on ~ppeal are whether the court erred in overruling 
ob.JectI~ns Interposed by the state to the introduction of cer-
taIn eVIdence on the question of severance damages whether 
the co~rt erred prejudicially in the matter of in~tructions 
to the Jury and whether the verdict is supported by the evi-
dence. 
Th?re is ~o other contention of the plaintiff which is not 
~~ectIvely dIsposed of by the foregoing discussion and author-
ItIes. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
We concur: Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer J. con-
curred. ' , 
EDMONDS, J.-I am unable to concur in an opinion which 
un~upported by authority in this state or elsewhere under th~ 
~~se of "de~ning" existing property rights, extends the pro-
VISIOns of article I, section 14, of the California Constitution to 
a d~~ree ne~er be~ore recognized, thereby establishing rules of 
deCISIOn WhICh WIll, in large measure, make the construction 
of n~cessary hig?way improvements prohibitive in cost. More 
speCIfically, I dIssent from the conclusions of my associates 
as stated b~ Mr. Justice Shenk for the following reasons: 
(1) ~espIte the law uniformly to the contrary throughout 
the Umted States, the decision entitles an abutting property 
owner ~o compens~tion for the additional distance he must 
t~avel In the ~ubhc street before he reaches the lanes of a 
hIghway carrying the through traffic. 
(2) In .allowing r~cove~ for such "circuity of travel," 
the .co~rt IS ~lready IgnorIng the restrictions just prescribed 
by It I? l!~c~ch v. Board of Oontrol, ante, p. 343 [144 P.2d 
818J, lImItIng rec.overy to the owners of property lying be-
tween an obstruction .and the first intersecting street. 
(3) Fo~ the first tIme in the .iudicial history of the state 
reco~ery IS allowed because the main Bow of traffic, whe~ 
pas~Ing through a subway constructed for the safe and con-
vement use of :the highway, will no longer have a completely 
unobstructed ~Iew of the abutting landowner's premises. 
(4) In statIng the rule creating this right of view aO'ainst 
the State, the decisions distinguishing between the ~law-
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ful impairment or obstruction of view in the public street 
by a private individual and a lawful interference with the 
view of abutting property occasioned by necessa17 and proper 
highway construction, are ignored. . 
(5) Although recognizing the established rule in thiS state 
denying compensation for a diminution in value of land 
occasioned by a highway project diverting traffic" from in 
front of his premises, the court inconsistently holds that the 
owner may recover damages because a person' traveling upon 
the street as rebuilt no longer can view his property. 
(6) The opinion studiously avoidS passing upon one of 
the vital questions presented in this appeal. There is no de-
termination as to whether a landowner is entitled to compen-
sation for any reduction in the width of the street upon 
which his property abuts or whether his easement of access 
may be said to extend only to such portion and width of the 
street as is reasonably necessary for the purposes of ingress 
and egress of the abutting owner, considering the nature of 
his property and the particular uses to which it is adaptable. 
(7) The procedure to be followed in the ascertainment of 
the new, property rights and the determination of the amount 
of damages to be, awarded for interference with them is left 
in complete uncertainty. The inconsistent pronouncements 
of my associates upon these issues will,be a fruitful source of 
litigation. They say that whether the proposed' improvement 
has resulted in a substantial impairment of a property right 
is a question of law or of fact, a contradictory statement b:n-
possible of application by the legal profession or the courts 
upon the trial of a condemnation suitor on' an appeal. Add-
ing to the confusion is the declaration' that 'the landowner is 
entitled to the difference between the market value of the 
entire parcel of land before a portion of it; is taken under , 
the power of eminent domain arid the,market value of the 
land remaining after the severance,' although it is' declared 
that certain elements diminishing theva1u~tnay,not'beicoIi~ , 
sidered. To me, such statements cim'only'meartthat thO$~ 
who have joined in the majority, opinio:n are not themselves 
in agreement upon these questions and concur in, ambiguity 
which hereafter may be' said to SUPP()rt either of the variant 
positions. " , 
(8) Although stating that a court, in defining ri~ht8 
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claimed to be infringed in violation of the constitutional 
provision, must balance against the necessity of safeguarding 
private property the duty to see "that the cost of public im-
provements . . . be not unduly enhanced," the rule is not 
applied. 
(9) :Notwithstanding the admission that the trial judge 
erred in instructing the jurors that the question as to whether 
the respondents had suffered an infringement of their rights 
in the property not sought to be condemned was one for 
them to determine, my associatet:! decide that the court had, 
by the admission of evidence, held that such impairment 
would be suffered and therefore no prejudice resulted. Yet 
the giving of this instruction completely negatives any prior 
ruling by the court upon that issue. Furthermore, if such a 
determination is a question of law, as stated in some parts 
of the opinion, no ruling upon it could be "implied in the 
verdict. " And if it is a question of fact, one is confronted 
by the statement: "In no case is it a 'question of fact for the 
jury' to determine." 
To understand fully the respective rights of the property 
owner and of the State requires, in my jUdgment, a more 
complete statement of the nature and extent of the proposed 
highway improvement than appears in the opinion of my 
associates and a summary of the testimony upon which the 
property owner was awarded damages. I shall therefore first 
present facts additional to those detailed by them and then, 
t:!onsidering all of the evidence which to me is relevant to the 
questions for decision, state the reasons for my conclusion 
that the judgment appealed from should be reversed and a 
new trial ordered upon the issue of consequential damages. 
As described by Mr .. Justice Shenk, because of the construc-
tion of an underpass with service roads parallel to it and 
within the boundaries of the boulevard as widened, the State 
is "re-routing the highway." Under any view of the testi-
mony, this statement can apply only to Rosemead Boulevard. 
And as to that thoroughfare, as well as Ramona Boulevard, 
in my opinion the evidence shows only a widening of each 
of them with lanes . and freeways designed in accordance 
with modern requirements for the protection and accelera-
tion of motor vehicles and the separation of grades ata 
major traffic intersection. 
The project for which part of the respondents' land ia 
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being condemned may be readily comprehended from ~he 
accompanYing photograph of a relief map used at the trIal. 
The boundaries of the two parcels ?f lan~ own~d by the re-
spondents, as they existed at the tIme t~IS actIon w.as c~m­
menced, are outlined on the map. In d~Slgn the engmeenng 
details for the widening and reconstructIOn of the two str~ets 
are comparable to those of many iI?provements now bemg 
planned for modernizing important hIghways to meet present 
day needs. 
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Rosemead Boulevard a part f h· .. 
designated as Route Hi8 (St ~ testate hIghway system 
468) is one of the main t :ee f and Hi~hways Code, sec. 
trict near Los A ar .er~es 0 travel m a suburban dis. 
sta~e highway Sy~!~e~S!;e:~sl~!e;s;;ite~ by Route 26 of the 
WhICh, for some distance 'th g ways Code, sec. 326) 
the name of Ramona Boul on el er s~de ?f. Route 168, bears 
of the Pacific Electric Rairard, Cand 1S dIV1ded by the tracks 
the property in controvers way ompany. In the vicinity of 
mona Boulevard that is th y, t~~ northerly.travel lane of Ra· 
the northerly bo~ndary ~f tt~or .~on ~f t~e h1ghway lying along 
at a dead end approximatel/~I rO~1 rIfht of way, commences 
and continues across it to th w~ ~~ s west of Route 168 
and a quarter, intersectin : eas a lstance of about a mile 
of Route 26 which lies to fh nU~ber of streets. That part 
road west of Route 168 for e sout o~ the tracks is a paved 
intersection it is unpaved a~veral mIles .. To the east of the 
respondents' witnesses "a dd' .as descrIbed by one of the 
I ' n or mary lane " 
n 1938, the Highway Commi . . 
reciting that public interest d SSlOn .adopted. a resolution 
sition and construction of ~n t ne?eSsIty reqUIre the acqui. 
prop:rty. The Department ao; ;~bt~g~ay upon ce;tain real 
acqUIre the necessary land b d O;ks was dIrected to 
present action was comme· Yd con emnahon. Thereafter, the Th nce . 
e property mentioned in th . 
plaint is described as tw ~ resolutIOn and in the com-
Rosemead Boulevard. TogZtl~~r~~es, each of which fronts on 
as the westerly 90 feet and th ~ may be roughly described 
acres of land owned b th e sout erly 32 feet of about three 
Aye respondents 
ttached to the complaint is a ma . . 
of this land and the port' f' p showmg the boundaries 
anoth~..J' giving the detaile~o;ls 0 f It ~?;ght to be condemned, 
Grades of Rosemead Blvd &anR or roposed Separation of 
d . . . amona Blvd" d . epIctmg a cross section of th :' an a thIrd 
Rosemead BOulevard F h e proposed Improvement of 
offered upon trial it'a rom t ese maps and the evidence 
land described in' the P:e:afs t~hat the State is acquiring the 
which. is owned by the respOo~dI:~s a~d the complaint, all of 
structmg the two state h' h ,or the purpose of recon-
of the center portion of ~o~:ys and separating the grade 
from Route 26 (Ramona B I 168 (Rosemead Boulevard) 
h ou evard) and '. t at street in a subway Wh th '. c.arrymg It under 
. en e prOJect IS completed, for 
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several hundred feet from the intersection of the two high. 
ways the width of Route 168 will be 280 feet and that of 
Route 26, including a center section carrying the railroad 
tracks, 255 feet. 
Using the street names in further description of the grade 
separation project, north of Ramona Boulevard, the widening 
of Rosemead Boulevard will end at Glendon Way, which is 
the first intersecting street. The distance between them is 
about 525 feet. To the east of Rosemead Boulevard, Ramona 
Boulevard will occupy the increased area for a much greater 
distance and far beyond the easterly line of the respondents' 
land. 
South of Glendon Way, Rosemead Boulevard will have two 
roadways, each of which will be 35 feet wide. At a point in 
the neighborhood of 150 feet south of Glendon Way, they 
will commence to decline in a subway through which they 
will be carried under Ramona Boulevard at a maximum· depth 
of approximately 18 feet. For safety purposes, the two road· 
ways will be divided by an area four feet in width and curb 
high. Paralleling these traffic lanes the State will construct 
what it terms "service roads" at approximately the present 
grade of Rosemead Boulevard which will continue to Ramona 
Boulevard. They will afford direct access to the adjacent 
property. 
The highway plans show that the portion of Ramona Bou· 
levard to the north of the section used by the railroad is to 
have a 35 foot freeway for westbound fast travel and an 
outer lane 30 feet wide, also described as a service road, for 
local use. The portion of Rosemead Boulevard to continue 
at the present grade will intersect that part of Ramona Bou· 
levard which is designed for local travel. When the two high. 
ways are reconstructed, the land of the respondents not taken 
by the State will have frontage on the "service roads" con· 
necting with the center lanes reserved for tra~c through 
the subway and also with Ramona Boulevard freeways. 
Over the objections of the State, expert witnesses for the 
property owners explained that they had considered as an 
element of consequential damage the fact that the widening 
of the two boulevards and the construction of the underpass 
would block the respondents' land from access to the main 
traveled portions of the highways except through the circuit-
ous routes afforded by the outer lanes. They further testified, 
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over a similar objection, that another factor entering into 
their estimate of severance damages was what they termed 
"loss of visibility." 
One of these witnesses pointed out that before the high-
ways are reconstructed a person may reach or leave the Ricci-
ardi property at any point along its frontage on the two 
streets. After the widening and reconstruction of Ramona 
Boulevard, said he, the land "will have a direct contact only 
on ... a narro.w lane or alley which has been termed by the 
State as a serVIce road. On the west, the property which now 
abuts .on Rosemead Boulevard will have no access [to it] ... 
but WIll abut ... on another alley or lane or so-called serv-
ice road." The service road paralleling Ramona Boulevard 
he told the jury, "apparently is not carried out so that ther~ 
is any direct contact with the easterly end of Ramona Boule-
vard." It will be a dead end street, making it necessary "to 
come through another opening at this point . . . down to 
Ramona Boulevard."· . And only by following the service road 
along the westerly boundary of the respondents' property 
to Glendon Way may one reach Rosemead Boulevard.More-
over, by governmental regulation, in his opinion a left-hand 
turn will be prohibited in the intersection of Giendon Way 
and Rosemead Boulevard. 
On the subject of loss of visibility the witness stated that 
the difference in grade of the center travel lanes of Rosemead 
~oul~vard ~nd ~he. construction of the subway· will greatly 
ImpaIr efficle~t. Ingress to and egress from the property be-
cause one drIVIng north through the underpass will not be 
able to see it before reaching the point where a turn can be 
~a~~ .. As t~ travel in the opposite direction, he added, the 
vIs~bIhty :vIII be greatly impaired by the change of grade 
wh~ch ~egIns at Glendon Way. Using Rosemead Boulevard 
a~ ~t WIll be reconstructed, in approaching the property "ad-
ditIOnal means of perception" must be used. 
. The same reason was given by another witness as the basis 
In part, for his opinion concerning the amount of severanc; 
damages which the respondents will sustain on account of 
the loss ~f visibility. When the state's project is completed, 
he explaIned, a traveler proceeding north under Ramona 
Boulev.ard will not be able to see the Ricciardi property from 
the POInt at the south entrance of the underpass where the 
declIne cOnImences, to about the same relative place on the 
Dec. 1943] PEOPLE v. RICCIARDI [23 C.2d 390] 
413 
other side of the structure. He must then travel to Glendon 
Way and turn back. And, by the time one. going in a south-
erly direction on Rosemead Boulevard arrIves ~t the former 
southerly line of the Ricciardi property, he WIll then be 18 
feet below the present grade of the highway. "It is my opin-
ion" he concluded "that the view will be sufficiently inter-
fer~d with so that 'anyone desiring to reach Mr. Ricciardi's 
property will be inclined to lose his way on account of the 
circuitous route and fail to reach the property for that 
reason." . . ' 
A third appraiser in stating the factors he consId~red In 
his estimate of the amount of severance damage whIch the 
property owners will sustain by reason of the reconstruc~ion 
of the two highways included among. them the followmg: 
" ... Previous to the construction of the improvement Parcel 
No. 1 had free and easy access or ingress and· egress both on. 
Ramona Boulevard and on Rosemead Boulevard. . ., After 
the construction of the proposed improvement . . . the two 
center lanes of Rosemead Boulevard will be on a changing 
grade along the entire frontage of th~ Ricciardi p:operty." 
Continuing hIS testimony and speaking as .of a tIme when 
the highways are rebuilt, he said that the ~cciardi pro~erty 
"hasn't any egress or ingress whatever directly on eIther 
Rosemead Boulevard or Ramona Boulevard. The only means 
of ingress and egress is by service roads'. . ; which run in a 
circuitous route from all directions, and in order to reach 
the Ricciardi property it is necessary to take one of those 
service roads from either Ramona Boulevard or Rosemead 
Boulevard .... " 
Upon this and other evidence, the jury awarded the respon-
dents $9000 as the value of Parcel No.1, and $15,000 as 
damages 'for its severance from the remainder of the property. 
The value of Parcel No.2 was placed at $350, with no sever~ 
ance damages. No complaint is made concerning the amount 
determined to be the value of the land taken from the re-
spondents in connection with a street widening. and grade 
separation project, but it is charged that the eVIdence does 
not support the award of $15,000 made for severance damages. 
Where a portion only of a landowner's property has been 
taken for a public improvement, the question necessarily 
arises as to the amount of compensation to which he is en· 




Three alternative formulas have been used In a fe . . di . , ' . w JurIS-
chons consequential damages have been allowed as part of 
the val.ue of the land ,taken by appraising the value of the 
part With reference to the diminution in value of the whole. 
~nother ~roup. of courts has stated that just compensation 
m a partIal-taking case should be measured by the difference 
between the market value of the whole before the taking and 
the market value of the remainder after the takin Th 
formula accepted in the majority of states howeverg· is th: 
value o! the part taken plus damages to the r;mainder. '(Orgel, 
ValuatIOn. Under the Law of Eminent Domain, 1936, p. 218.) 
My assocIates properly recognize that every diminution in 
value of land caused by public improvement is not compen-
sa.ble .under th~ eminent domain clause of the California Con-
~htu~IOn. I~ IS therefore apparent that the test to be used 
In thIS state IS not the difference between the market value of 
the. land before. the taking and the market value of the re-
mamder followmg the severance but that thlS· . . d· t· . . JurIS IC IOn 
IS commItted. to what may be termed the majority rule. 
Th~ necessIt! for allowing recovery on a basis other than 
the. dIfference In market value of the entire parcel before the 
takmg an~ the market value of the land remaining after the 
severanc~ IS ~lear, for many acts of government resulting in 
a reducti~n I~ the .value of private property may be per-
~ormed With ImpUnIty by citizens acting in their own self 
lD~er~st. A .municipality, for example, may establish a publi~ 
bUIldIng serIOusly impairing the value of adjacent residential 
pr?perty. It need 'pay n~ .compensation for this injury,1 but 
neIthe.r would a prIvate CItizen be liable for a similar damage 
resultm~ f:om the ~onstruction of an equally undesirable 
office bUIldIng. ~bvlOusly, the value of real estate may de-
~rease very materIally as the result of the use which an ad-
J~cent property owner may lawfully make of his land and 
s~nce the owner has no right of action against such an' indi-
VIdual for the damages thus caused, by the same token it may 
1 The government may cond . t 
jail or "pest house" with emn prlva e. prope~ty and erect upon it a 
for the undeniable im ir;ut compel!satmg adJacent property owners 
such public Use. (See Wach~n~ 01 :h~;r property values as a result of 
[37 p 570 42 A St R . 0 . nge e8 etc. By., 103 Cal. 614 617 
City df Wlnche~to~· v.' ;l:;g,1~~]2; I~l~g~~~ v55g~tg~go[ll402NIEll. 64,' SO'; 
A.L.R. 520]· Ctty of Gea M' .. 833 36 
distinguishing Oklah C? v. V oore, lSI Okla. 616 [75 P.2d Sill] 
oma 11/ v. etter, 72 Okla. 196 [179 P. 473].) , 
PEOPLEt'. 'RrOOTAtmt 
[23 C.2d 390] 
415 
not reasonably be said that compensation for similar damage 
caused by the lawful use of property owned by the public 
was intended to be guaranteed to private individuals under 
the eminent domain clause of the California Constitution. 
(Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles, 19 Ca1.2d 19, 24 [119 P. 
2d 1]; O'Hara v. Los Angeles Oounty Flood etc. Dist., 19 
Cal.2d 61, 63 [119 P .2d 23].) Therefore, since such factors 
may necessarily have contributed to reduction in market value 
of land remaining after the severance of part of it by the 
state, it is apparent that the difference in market value before 
and after the taking is an improper formula for ascertaining 
recoverable compensation. 
Moreover, any distinction predicated upon the allowance 
of compensation for a reduction in value of land attributable 
to a lawful use of state property because there has been an, 
appropriation of part of it, when no compensation would be 
awarded for the same element of damage without such a sev-
erance, is unsound. For, obviously, it would be unfair dis-
crimination to reimburse a property owner for such damage 
to his property simply because a portion of it, however small, 
may have been condemned, while denying to one from whom 
no land is taken recovery for a comparative reduction iIi value 
of his land. To allow a recovery to one property owner but 
not to another under such circumstances would obviously be 
arbitrary and unsupportable under the provisions of article I, 
section 14, of the California Constitution requiring compen-
sation for a "damaging" as well as a "taking" of private 
property'. Any language in Oolusa &7 Hamilton R. R. 00. v. 
Leonard, 176 Cal. 109, 113 [167 P. 878], indicating the pos-
sible propriety of the distinction, is unwarranted and should 
be disapproved. Although it may be, difficult, it is neverthe-
less necessary to exclude evidence as to that diminution in 
value which an owner of land from which a part has been 
taken may have suffered along with adjacent property owners 
because of the use detrimental to the remainder of his prop-
erty. . 
The present action concerns property to which the State 
has title, and is now using, for highway purposes. Because 
of this fact, "The inauguration of a new use of a highway 
under proper authority within the general purposes for which 
the highway was created, is generally held not to constitute 
a 'taking or damaging' of the property of the abutting owner 
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within the constitutional provision. The public has the right, 
as against the owner of the fee, to prepare and reserve the 
whole or a part of a highway for special forms of travel." 
(18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, sec. 188, pp. 818, 819.) One 
of the purposes, however, for which highways are created is 
to provide a means of access to property abutting upon it. 
Consequently, as stated by the majority opinion, the courts 
have declared and enforced the property owner's right of 
access to the highway on which his property abuts. But the 
easement of access, properly defined, may be said to extend 
only to such portion and width of the street as is reasonably 
necessary for the purposes of ingress and egress of the abut-
ting owner, considering the nature of his property and the 
particular uses to which it is adaptable. (See Rose v. State 
of California, 19 Ca1.2d 713, 728 [123 P.2d 505]; 1 Lewis, 
Eminent Domain [3d ed. 1909], p. 190.) Accordingly, the 
owner of abutting land has no absolute right, as against the 
public, to insist that the adjacent street always remain avail-
able for use in the same manner and to the same extent as 
when it vras constructed. Regulations such as the prescrib-
ing of one-way traffic or the prohibiting of left-hand turns 
upon it may interfere to that extent with the right of access 
without subjecting the municipality to liability for the result-
ing impairment. (See note, 100 A.L.R. 487, 491-493.) 
The abutting owner's easement does not, therefore, as a 
matter of law, entitle him to the use of the full width of the 
street, nor does it include the right to a street wholly free of 
obstruction. Thus the mere narrowing of a street is not ipso 
facto an infringement of his right of access (Brown v. Board 
of Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274, 281 [57 P. 82] ; and see Bigley 
v. Nunan, 53 Cal. 403), but where there is evidence shoWing 
that the reduction in width has left a street insufficient in 
width to afford ingress and egress in a reasonable manner, 
an interference with his right is clearly established (Rose v. 
State of California, supra). Similarly, a change in the grad( 
of a street or the construction of an improvement thereon 
does not per se constitute an interference with the right of 
access (Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171, 174, 175 [88 P. 713]; 
Montgomery v. Santa Ana etc. Co., 104 Cal. 186, 190 [37 P. 
786, 43 Am.St.Rep.89, 25 L.R.A. 654] ; City of San Mateo v. 
Railroad Commission, 9 Ca1.2d 1, 9, 10 [68 P.2d 713]), but 
if the obstruction substantially interferes with ingress and 
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egress to the property, considering its nature and the pa;ti~u­
lar uses to which it is adaptable, the easement of access IS ~­
paired. (Rose v. State of California, supra; Eachus v. C",ty 
of Los Angeles, 130 Cal. 492 [62 P. 829, 80 Am.St.Rep. 147] ; 
Williams v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592 [89 P. 
330] j Lane v. San Diego Elec. By. Co., 208 Cal. 29 [280 P. 
109] ; McCandless v. City of Los Angeles, 214 CaL 67 [4 P. 
2d 139].) 
For example, in Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. By. ~o., ~upra., 
the defendant railway company made an exca:vatlOn ~ tJ;e 
street in front of the plaintiff's property WhICh. v~ned In 
depth from 20 to 28 feet, leaving ~nly a. l?-foot strIp m front 
of the premises for access. And m W",Zliams :V. Los AngeZes 
etc. R~/. Co., supra, the construction by the r~ilway company 
of a sWl~"'.h and signal tower in the street m ~ront. of. the 
plaintiff's business premises directly i~terfered WIth h~s right 
of ingress and egress. Because the railway compa~y, m Lane 
v.SanDiego Elec. By. Co., SUp1'a~ constructed Its track so 
close to the plaintiff's land that a vehicle could not be parked 
tn front of it while a streetcar passed by, the court held that 
the landowners' right of access was substantially al!d seriously 
impaired. Likewise, the construction of a pede~tnansubw~y 
terminal so that it extended in front of and adJacent to one-
third of the plaintiff's premises, which were zoned fo~ gen-
eral business purposes, was held, in McCandless v. Ctty of 
Los AngeZes, supra, to be a substantial impairment of the 
owner's right of ingress and egress. ..' , 
The street improvement which occaslOned th~ ~ontroversy 
in Rose v. State of California, supra, was very s~~r ~ that 
shown in the present case. There, however, the ehmmatlOn. of 
the grade crossing and construction ~f the subway le~t .lan4 
fronting upon a 14-foot lane for vehIcular. traffic, an Insufli~ 
cient space to afford reasonable means for mgress ~d egre~s, 
considering the possible use of the property for mdustrIal 
purposes. According to the testimony, the lane was too nar-
row for two vehicles traveling in opposite' directions to pas~~ 
and upon the ground that the record. showed substantial eVl-
dence to support the finding of interference with the easement 
'of access, a judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. In the 
present case, however, after the project is completed, ?te re-
spondents' property will abut, along the same two Sldes as 
Is O.2d-l' 
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before the improvement was begun, upon roadways 30 feet 
in width. No facts are testified to by the witnesses for the 
respondents showing that the 30-foot roadway provides an 
insufficient means of access for a full and reasonable use of 
the property, considering its nature and the particular uses 
to which it is adaptable. Certainly no interference with the 
easement of access for the use of the property as a slaughter-
house, with facilities for the operation of a wholesale and 
retail meat market, is established merely by the fact that the 
roadways are 30 feet wide. 
It is true that the appraisers who testified on behalf of 
the respondents premised their opinions as to severance 
damages, at least in part, upon their conclusion that after 
the subway project is completed, the Ricciardi property will 
not have frontage on either Rosemead or Ramona, but on 
what one of them described as a "narrow lane or alley" 
That the roadways will not be narrow lanes or alleys is, ap-
parent from their width and relation to the project as a 
whole. Whether those upon which the property will front 
will still be called "Rosemead" and "Ramona" boulevard 
respect~vely, is not disclosed by the evidence, although th; 
Co~~lU:SIOn that ~hey will be a part of those highways is im-
plICIt In the testImony of one of the respondents' appraisers 
who spoke of the roadway passing through the subway as 
"the two center lanes of Rosemead Boulevard." (Italics 
added.) B.ut, in any event, the solution of the problem of 
compensatIOn depends upon much more fundamental con-
s~derations than the mere label or change in name of a par-
tIcular street, and a property owner has no right to insist 
upon the retention of a highway name. 
Of more importance is the fact that, by resolution, the Cali-
fornia Highway Commission has authorized the condemna-
ti.on of the Ricciardi property for Route 168 of the state 
hlgh~ay system, declaring "that the taking of said lands in 
fee IS necessary to and for such public use and that it is 
ne.cessary that all of said lands be so taken"; also "that the 
saId proposed State highway is planned and located in a 
~anner which will be most compatible with the greatest pub-
hc good and the least private injury." And according to 
t~e map and the exhibits, only one right of way for state 
hlgh~ay Route 168 is shown, which is the full width of ap-
proxImately 280 feet, the various separate construction de-
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tails being all within the exterior boundaries of tha~ right ~ 
of way. In addition, the explanation made by the state's 
highway engineer, whose testimony is relied upon hy both' 
the respondents and the appellant, shows that, Highway 168.' 
in the vicinity of the subway project, with the service roads, 
and the sloping walls, will be 280 feet in width, and, that: 
the 255-foot right of way directly south of the premises' will' 
be a part of' Route 26. He als~ testified that the service, 
roads "were a part or the major plan" and "appurtenant 
to the whQle thing as a unit." Unquestionably, the entire 
280 feet of the widened Highway 168 and the 255 feet which, 
with the exception of the railroad tracks in the center, is 
to be occupied by Highway 26, will. be used ~or essential 
highway purposes, title to all of this land being in, the state. 
Obviously, the safety objectives of the subway would be to 
a seriollil degree defeated should traffic be allowed to enter or, 
cross the main flow of passage through it at the entrances to 
the tunnel. Additional complications also would, arise through 
the change in grade necessary for the vehicular traffic to 
pass beneath the railway tra.cks on Rosemead. Under such 
circumstances, the aptly designated service roads are neces-
sary to the successful utilization of the subway, form an essen-
tial part of the project for separation of grades and will' 
furnish the only reasonable means for the owners of land now 
abutting on Rosemead Boulevard as presently constructed, 
and those others of the public who presently approach Rose-
mead along the north side or the' railroad tracks on Ramona, 
safely to enter the through flow of traffic on Rosemead. ' 
So far as the owners of or visitors to the Ricciardi property 
are concerned, upon the completion of the contemplated im-
provement, they will still have unobstructed access to the high-
way system. Arter the changes are completed, if they wish 
to travel west they may either immediately turn into tho 
westbound freeway of Highway 26 through the opening in 
the cubing separating the Ramona service road from the 
freeway, which is located at the corner of their premises, or 
continue over the subway on the service road in a westerly 
direction until they choose to enter the freeway at some sub-
sequent opening in the curbing. In going east, they may 
immediately go in an easterly direction along the Ramona 
service road until they come to the fi:rst intersection crossing 
the railroad tracks, where they may enter the eastbound 
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freeway of Ramona located just south of the railway right of 
way. Similarly, in traveling north, they may immediately 
go north on the service road paralleling the through chan-
nels of Rosemead and enter those lanes at Glendon Way. 
The only direction in which they may not immediately travel 
is to the south on Rosemead. In order to go south, they must 
travel north on either of the service roads paralleling the sub-
way structure and then turn into the southbound traffic on 
the lanes of Rosemead leading to the underpass. But the fact 
that the particular portion of the highway system upon which 
they will immediately travel does not directly enter into "the 
two center lanes of Rosemead Boulevard" is because such an 
entry would be unsafe, and also impracticable because of the 
change in grade necessitated for the underpass. And if they 
were allowed to cross the railway tracks, upon the same grade 
as the track, in order to enter the service roads paralleling 
Rosemead on the south side of the underpass, one of the es-
sential objectives in constructing the subway would be lost. 
The additional distance which they must travel before enter-
ing ~he main flow of traffic on Rosemead is required by the 
publIc safety and the proper and reasonable construction of 
the subway. It is no different from the additional distances 
one must travel because of traffic regulations or the construc-
tion of divided highways. Under these circumstances as the 
respondents will be afforded full and unobstructed a~cess to 
streets bordering their premises on the same sides as their 
property presently abuts on the highways, and it will be suf-
~cient for their needs of ingress and egress, no compensation. 
IS recoverabl~ merely because of the additional dista:q.ce they 
must travel m the public street before they will be able to 
turn into the lanes of traffic leading under the subway, so 
that they may travel south on Rosemead Boulevard. 
But the respondents claim that the service roads will be 
constructed as a means of compensating the abutting owners 
in lieu of. paying thl3m in money for the damage resulting 
~rom the Improvement. Those joining in the majority opin-
IOn have been misled by this specious argument, as shown by 
their statement: "In providing for the service roads the state 
must be deemed to have proceeded in frank recognition of the 
private right of access possessed by the defendants that such 
right would be invaded, and intended by means of ~hose serv-
ice roads to minimize and entirely absorb the damages to 
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which the defendants would otherwise be entitled." But, 
as is clearly apparent from the evidence, the vital purpose of 
the service roads is to provide a means for Highway 168 to 
connect with Highway 26 so that traffic can flow between 
them, and this fact is conclusively shown from the resolution 
of the Highway Commission. And since an earlier junction 
of the service road with the underpass highway would safely 
be impracticable at any more southerly point than Glendon 
Way, the means adopted are not unreasonably more drastic 
than necessary to achieve the ends essential to the construc-
tion and completion of the Rosemead and Ramona crossing 
at the separated grades required for the underpass. 
The basic error of the majority opinion in allowing recov-
ery for the additional distance travelers to and from the Ric-
ciardi property must go in order to reach the through lanes 
of traffic upon Rosemead Boulevard, lies in its misconception 
of the right of access of an abutting owner upon the highway 
system. For the owner's right of access is only over whatever 
street or portion of the highway system exists upon a par-
ticular boundary of his property, provided that full and un-
obstructed ingress and egress to and from his property to an 
extent reasonably necessary for its full beneficial use is unim-
paired. He has no vested right in any particular avenue of 
the highway carrying any particular flow of traffic, but only 
a right to have his land front upon a part of the highway 
system sufficient to afford reasonable access to his property. 
The fallacy of my associates' reasoning in this regard is illus-
trated by the statement: "We recognize that the defendants 
have no property right in any particular flow of traffic over . . ' ,. (;.,"'. . . r "': 
the highway adjacent to their property, but ,they dO.p()ssess 
the right of direct access to the through traffic highway and 
an easement of view of their property fromsucbhighway. 
If traffic normally flowing over that highway were' re-routed 
or if another highway were constructed, which resulted in a 
substantial amount of traffic being diverted from that through 
highway the value of their property might be diminished, but 
in such event defendants would have no right to compensation 
by reason of such re-routing or diversion of traffic. The re-
routing or diversion of traffic in such a case would be a mere 
police power regulation, or the incidental result of a lawful 
act, and not the taking or damaging of a property right. But 
here we do not have a mere re-routing or diversion of traffic 
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from the highway; we have, instead, a substantial change in 
the highway itself in relation to the defendants' property 
rather than a mere re-routing of traffic in relation to the 
highway. Defendants' private property rights in and to that 
highway are to be taken and damaged. It is only for such 
private property rights that compensation has been assessed. 
The court allows no damages to be predicated ou any diversion 
of traffic from the highway but it did properly allow dam-
ages to be based on diversion of the highway from direct 
access to defendants' proper-~y." 
If this language means anything, it creates in an abutting 
own~r a vested right in a specific traffic avenue carrying a 
p~rtlc.ular . bur~en of traffic. Carried out to its necessary im-
p~I~atlOn, .It wIll also entitle the property owner upon -an un-
dIVIded hIghway to damages whenever the street is recon-
struc~ed, in accordance with modern highway engineering 
~rac~Ice fo~ the safety and convenience of the traveling pub-
h~, . mto hlghsp~ed separated freeways for through traffic 
dIVIded by. curbIngs from lanes constructed for purposes of 
local and mtersecting traffic, with openings into the main 
freeways only at comparatively widely spaced intervals. For 
obviously, under such circumstances, the abutting owner no 
longer may go directly from his property to the lanes of the 
highway carrying the through traffic, upon which his land 
formerly abutted. More specifically, the majority opinion 
app~oves an award of damages based in part not only upon 
testlmony that the respondents' land will be less valuable 
because of the additional distance one must travel from it in 
order to reach the through lanes upon Rosemead Boulevard 
b~t also, although not expressly stated, for the additionai 
dIstance one must travel on the lanes for local traffic which 
are a part of Ramona Boulevard before he may enter the free-
ways carrying the main flow of traffic along that highway. 
The prohibiti:ve effect which the allowance of recovery for 
such a factor ~Ill have upon ~he construction of increasingly 
necessary arterIal freeways, WIthout grade crossings, to serve 
c~nters_of large population, is readily apparent when one con-
SIders such contemplated highway projects as the proposed 
Bayshore freeway to bear the traffic from San Francisco 
down the Peninsula. a~ far as Palo Alto and, eventually, to 
San Jose, and the sImllar freeway being considered for traf-
fic from San Fernando to San Pedro in Los Angeles County, 
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both of which include numerous structures fqrgrade separa~; 
tion similar to that shown by the plans in the present case., 
And it may also be assumed that, in 8.cco~dallce wi~h- st~d. 
ardized engineering practice, a substantial p,ortion .... of these, 
highways will be built at a grade much lower than adjoining, 
streets. . 
But the majority opinion adopts a rule, creating a property 
right never before recognized, without t~e citation of a single; 
authority in support of its unique position. As a· matter of 
fact,. the law throughout the United States is uniformly ,to the, 
contrary. For example, in what is probably the most recellt 
case involving the problem, it was held that the owner of. 
property could not recover consequential damages because< 
travelers to and from his premises would have to travel a 
distance of approximately 2,000 feet farther in order to reach 
the newly located highway. (In re ~oard ofSup~r8 of Ohe-
nango Oounty, 13 N.Y.S.2d 730 [1939].) Consequently, even 
if it is accurate to state that the proposed improvement will 
result in a "diversion of the highway from direct access to de-
fendants' property," no recovery should be permitted. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that, despite such juggling of 
words as "re-routing of traffic" as distinguished from "re-
routing of the highway," the element of damage involved in 
either is the same. The diminution in value, if any, to an 
abutting landowner will arise from the fact that the traffic 
formerly passing adjacent to his property will no longer be 
able directly to reach his land without traveling an additional 
distance. And, as the majority opinion has recognized, the 
law is settled in this state that such an element of damage is 
noncompensable. (Rose v. State o/Oalifornia, supra, at p. 737 j 
Oity of Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal.App. 760, 762, 763 [31 
P.2d 467] j People v. Gianni, 130 Cal.App. 584 [20 P.2d 87].) 
And although I am convinced that the service roads are 
an essential and integral part of Highway 168, even were the 
majority opinion's treatment of them as entirely separate 
and distinct highways correct, the· allowance of recovery for 
the additional distance to be traveled in order to ,reach the 
main highway is squarely contrary to the limitations whic.h 
these same members of the court have placed upon damage 
caused by circuity of travel in the cul-de-sac cases, by the 
decision in Bacielt v. Board of Oontrol, ante, p. 343 [144 
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P.2d 818]. For since the Ricciardi property is located upon 
a corner which abuts upon roadways with an outlet at either 
end into connecting streets, it is not located in a cul-de-sac. 
In estimating the severance damages suffered by the re-
spondents, their appraisers testified to a loss of visibility 
which will occur by reason of the construction of the subway. 
However, as there will be no impairment of view from the 
Ricciardi property caused by the change in grade of the lanes 
passing through the underpass or by the subway structure, 
the problem is factually limited to whether an owner of land 
has an easement of view of his premises from the street or 
highway which entitles him to compensation because, by the 
change in grade necessitated for vehicles to travel through an 
underpass, his property cannot be seen at all times. 
My associates' treatment of the question is summary. "The 
weight of authority seems to be in favor of the proposition 
that an abutting owner of property on a public highway has 
an easement of reasonable' view of his property from the 
highway," states the opinion. "The right of reasonable view, 
in addition to the right of ingress and egress, is named as one 
of the easements possessed by the abutting owner in Williams 
v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. 00., 150 Cal. 592, 595 [89 P. 330]." 
However, although the rule stated is correct insofar as 
it goes, it has no application to the facts of this case. For 
the doctrine of the decisions cited in the annotation relied 
upon by the majority opinion in support of its statement 
more accurately is that there is an easement or property right 
of view both to and from the street as against obstruction by 
an adjoining owner or other private individual. But no such 
right exists as against the state when the view of the prem-
ises by passersby is impaired by the erection of such struc-
tures as are reasonably necessary to secure the safety or pro-
mote the convenience of the traveling public. (Perlmutter 
v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327 [182 N.E. 5, 81 A.L.R. 1543]; Mc-
Oarthy v. Oity of Minneapolis, 203 Minn. 427 [281 N.W. 
759] ; 1 Lewis on Eminent Domain, sttpra, sec. 124, pp. 191-
193; 25 Am.Jur., Highways, sec. 155, pp. 451, 452, sec. 319, 
p. 613; and see Kelbro Inc. v. Myrick (1943), 113 Vt. 64 [30 
A.2d 527, 530, 531] ; but see Liddick v. Oity of Oouncil BlUffs 
(1942), - Iowa - [5 N.W.2d 361, 374, 379]; 4 Mc-
Quillin, op. cit., sec. 1488, p. 198; notes, 90 A.L.R. 793, 40 
A.L.R. 1321.) 
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Thus, in Lewis on Eminent Domain, although the author 
recognizes the right of the abutting owner to an unobstructed 
view to and from any part of the street, he declares: II This 
right is subject of course to all legitimate street uses, but it 
cannot be interfered with for private purposes with or with-
out compensation nor by structures placed ill the street for 
public purposes which are not legitimate street uses, unless 
compensation is made." (2 Lewison Eminent D?main l3d 
ed. 1909], sec. 124, pp. 192, 193.) . And American Jurispru-
dence states the rule as follows: "It is wen established that 
an abutting owner has also an easement of view' of his prem-
ises from every part of the street or' highway, as . well as 
from his premises into the way, of which he ca:nnot be de-
prived by encroachments placed on the way by an adjacent 
proprietor, although there are some holdings to the contrary. 
But such easement of view is likewise subject to the 
enjoyment of the public right in the highway, and the erec-
tion by the public authorities of such structures as are rea-
sonably necessary to secure the safety or promote the conve-' 
nience of travelers does not constitute an unlawful interfer-
ence therewith." (25 Am.Jur., Highways, sec. 155, p. 452.) 
This principle is recognized in Williams v. Los Angeles 
etc. By., supra, where the court indicated that the private 
railway company would not have been subject to liability for 
impairment of the right of view by the erection of a switch 
tower in front of the plaintiffs' premises had the construction 
of the tower been essential for the operation of the railway. 
The reason for such distinction is obvious. An adjoining 
landowner obviously has no right to place obstructions in th~ 
public highway to the detriment of the owner of abutting 
property. He is, however, free to erect whatever structures 
he sees fit within the boundaries of hiS property, even though 
such structures may interfere with the 'fotnier view enjoyed 
by his neighbor and .cause reduction in ilievalue of the lat-
ter's land. A similar situation arises ,when' the state'for ad~ 
mittedly proper highway purposes erects n:ec~ssarY ~~ry,ctu,rEt~ 
for the convenience or safety of. traffic, and the state should' 
no more be required to pay for the re:sftltlng damage toabut~ 
ting owners than would the private: person Jor lawful ac~ 
upon his land. Consequently since, mth.e present case, the 
portions of the highway from which no, -rlewof the Ricciardi 
premises will be possible must be'lowered'korder to carry 
; ;! 
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the traffic beneath the railroad tracks in furtherance of an 
undeniably proper highway purpose, no compensation should 
be allowed the respondents for such interference with the pass-
ing traffic's view of his land. 
In considering the function of the court and the jury in 
It' condemnation action, the majority opinion states that 
whether there has been a substantial impairment of a prop-
erty right, "is a question of law, or of fact, or a mixed ques,-
tion of law and fact, for the trial court to determine., In no 
case is it a 'question of fact for the jury' to determine." 
. This statement is fundamentally unsound and confusing. An 
issue of fact determinable by the court may, under certain 
circumstances, be submitted to the jury. (See cases collected 
in 10 Cal.Jur. Eminent Domain, sec. 107, p. 411.) And upon 
an appeal from the judgment, if the issue is one of fact, the 
sole duty of the appellate court is to ascertain whether there 
is evidence, or inferences properly to be drawn from the evi-
dence, in support of. the determination. On the other hand, 
if the issue is one of law, the court must exercise its indepen-
dent judgment upon the evidence presented by the record. 
As I understand the authorities upon this subject, the na-
ture and extent of a property right within the meaning of 
the eminent domain provision of the Constitution presents a 
question of law. Where, however, the right is so defined that 
its extent or impairment depends upon a factual element, 
such as, in the present case, the limitation of the easement ,of 
access to such portion and width of the street as is reasonably 
necessary for the purposes of ingress and egress of the abut-
ting owner, considering the nature of his property and the 
particular uses to which it is adaptable, the determination 
of this variable factor clearly falls within the province of 
the trier of fact even though its decision upon that question 
I]lecessarily includes a finding as to whether an impairment 
of the easement has occurred. Of course, the question as to 
the amount of injury sustained is one for the trier of fact 
to determine upon evidence confined to compensable items 
of damage. 
. In my opinion, for the reasons stated, the judgment should 
be affirmed insofar as it awards the respondents $9,350 for 
the land appropriated by the State; as to the amount awarded 
for consequential damages. the judgment should be reversed 
for a new trial upon that isl>ue. 
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CURTIS, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the. 
dissenting opinion. 
T.RAYNOR, J.-I dissent for reasons·setiforth in my dia-: 
senting opinion in Bacich v. Board of, ControZ, ante, p. 343 
[144 P.2d $18]. . 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing wail dehied January' 
17, 1944. Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and'Traynor,J., voted. 
for a rehearing. 
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Criminal Law - Appeal- Law of the Oase'""'-'Ooif1uilt with' 
Supreme Court Decision.-In a habeas'corpus .proceeding' to' 
obtain release from prison, the prior decisionofd;he; ,D,ismct;· 
Court of Appeal, in affirming petitioner's conviction" that, he· 
was to be considered a first offender,. was the lawo~ the case,' 
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similar case that the Board of Prison Terms and :paroles might 
consider the accompanying record ~hich showed that, .while 
the judgment was silent thereon, the offender had sUffered a 
prior conviction. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to,;secnre. release from 
custody. Petitioner remanded to . custody ·without··prejndice' 
to a redetermination by Board of Prison Terms' and Paroles 
of sentence to be served.' , 
Andrew Schneider in pro. per., for Petitioner. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, and David K. Lener, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-On September 14, 1938, the petitioner was 
sentenced to serve the period of time prescribed by law in 
the State Prison at Folsom for violation of section 476a of 
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